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I argue for sensory pluralism. This is the view that there are many forms of sensory
interaction and unity, and no single category that classifies them all. In other words,
sensory interactions do not form a single natural kind. This view suggests that how we
classify sensory systems (and the experiences they generate) partly depends on our
explanatory purposes. I begin with a detailed discussion of the issue as it arises for
our understanding of thermal perception, followed by a general account and defense of
sensory pluralism.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Start with two seemingly true statements: (i) We have many
senses; (ii) They often interact.
These statements are now widely acknowledged and incorpo-
rated into recent work on perception, but they are also in deep
tension with one another. Once we allow that the sensory modal-
ities interact, and do so pervasively at multiple levels of sensory
processing, with effects at all levels of our psychology (subper-
sonal, behavioral, and phenomenal), then it becomes difficult to
make sense of what, exactly, these individual senses might be.
Vision is less a single coherent modality than a complex collec-
tion of interacting subsystems. And that collection has features
different in kind from those found in the auditory, vestibular, and
nociceptive systems (of course, there are many similarities too).
Indeed, it can become difficult to maintain the idea that we can
have anything like a unified conception of sensory modalities and
their interactions.
I start with a detailed discussion of human thermoreception,
using it as a case study for the sort of tensions I describe above.
I then discuss the general implications of this example, and pro-
pose a robust theoretical framework for addressing this tension.
My claim is that we should abandon any single theoretical account
of sensory interaction, and adopt a view according to which sen-
sory systems and their interactions are classified in part by our
explanatory purposes. The upshot of this proposal is that it allows
us to fully acknowledge the deep interactions between sensory
subsystems without thereby giving up entirely on the very idea
of separate sensory modalities. The main target of my view is
any form of sensory monism that assumes there will be a sin-
gle, authoritative, and context free account of what it is to be
a sensory modality and for an interaction between them to be
“multisensory” or “multimodal.” On such a monist view, there
should be a single determinate answer to the question of whether
vestibular awareness or pain or any other putative sense counts as
a sensory modality. I believe such a view is implausible and deeply
problematic, and in what follows I offer a substantive alternative
account.
2. CASE STUDY: THERMAL PERCEPTION
We have a sensory system—commonly called the thermoreceptive
system—that involves a series of distinct receptor populations in
the skin (Schepers and Ringkamp, 2010). There are several dif-
ferent kinds of receptors involved, including thinly myelinated Aδ
afferents that have receptive fields tuned to cooling and unmeyli-
nated C afferents that code for both warming and cooling1 . These
various receptor populations systematically combine with other
cutaneous systems (like those that code for pressure, vibration,
and shape) to inform us about thermal properties in the distal
environment (Jones and Lederman, 2006; Lumpkin and Caterina,
2007). They thus seem to be a crucial component of haptic touch
(Fulkerson, 2014b). They also play an important role in our bod-
ily awareness and the regulation of body temperature (Hammel
and Pierce, 2002; Jones and Lederman, 2006), and so seem also to
belong to our general systems of bodily awareness (which includes
proprioception, kinesthesis, and our body schema). And finally,
thermoreceptors also play an important role in the nociceptive
system, informing us of bodily damage caused by extreme hot and
cold stimuli2 .
1As we’ll see, the different response patterns of these many afferent channels
play different roles in different contexts. For instance, the thinly myelinated Aδ
fibers play an especially important role in our perception of wetness (Ackerley
et al., 2012).
2That pain you feel when eating spicy foods? It’s caused by the activation of
thermoreceptors. Black pepper contains piperine and chili peppers contain
capsaicin, both of which both activate TPRV1 thermoreceptors. See Caterina
et al. (1997).
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How should we classify this thermoreceptor system? Is it even
one thing, given its many different afferent populations with
distinct receptive fields and activation profiles? Maybe thermore-
ception itself is multisensory? We can also ask whether it is a part
of touch. Should it be examined and investigated along with the
other constituents of haptic awareness? Or are these thermore-
ceptors really part of the nociceptive system? Exposure to extreme
heat and cold are, after all, among ourmost intense causes of pain.
Then again, perhaps it is part of our general system for bodily
awareness, since such thermoreceptors play such an important
role in the regulation of a comfortable bodily state. In each of
these cases, we can ask whether thatmakes touch, pain, and bodily
awareness essentially multisensory 3.
Similarly, we might wonder whether thermoreception is its
own independent sensory modality (multisensory or not). Is it
perceptual, or do we only become informed of distal thermal
properties indirectly, through inference from our bodily thermal
state?4 Each of these positions has been defended (sometimes
tacitly) in the literature (Martin, 1992; Schepers and Ringkamp,
2010; Gray, 2012). We are unlikely to make much progress on
these claims, I believe, until we realize that there really is no such
thing as the thermoreceptive system. The starting assumption
that there is such a single system leads, I shall argue, to insur-
mountable theoretical and practical difficulties. Instead of a single
thermalreceptive system, I believe that we have a complex series of
receptors and processing units that perform multiple overlapping
functions, and thus there are many, equally good ways of catego-
rizing these various systems (see Figure 1). On this view, relative
to one schema (its role in detecting and co-assigning features to
distal objects), the thermoreceptive system is indeed continuous
with (and therefore an essential part of) the sense of touch (itself
a context-sensitive construct). If we focus purely on the physio-
logical features of thermoreception, on the other hand, we have
strong reason to classify (some elements of) this system as con-
tinuous with other elements of the nociceptive system. Like those
other systems, many thermal channels involve slow, unmyelinated
afferent nerve fibers that project contralaterally in the spinal col-
umn (unlike discriminatory touch afferents, which are typically
3Nociception represents another ideal case study in the difficulties facing any
unified account of sensory interactions. For a convincing argument here see
Corns (2014). For earlier discussion see Aydede and Guzeldere (2002).
4See for example Gray (2012) for a nuanced discussion of what our thermal
experiences might represent even if focussed on the body.
FIGURE 1 | Three ways of classifying thermoreceptors.
myelinated and project ipsilaterally, Welsh, 2001). According to a
third schema, we can see that thermoreceptors also play an impor-
tant role in the awareness and regulation of body temperature,
and can be classified as part of a larger system of bodily aware-
ness that includes proprioception, vestibular awareness, and other
regulatory systems (Wenger, 1995).
Let’s focus on the details of this last claim, that our thermore-
ceptive system is part of a larger system of bodily awareness (the
details here are useful as an illustration; this is not intended as an
exhaustive argument about how to understand the thermal sys-
tem). One useful way of categorizing sensory systems concerns
whether they are outward-facing, giving us information about the
external world, or body-facing, giving us information and per-
forming functions primarily dedicated to bodily awareness and
homeostatic self-maintenance. This distinction is often thought
to be one between two separate systems: the exteroceptive system
and the interoceptive system5. Exteroception, the story goes, pro-
vides us with information about the external world. It is largely
informational and descriptive, giving us an evidence-like connec-
tion with the world around us. It is helpful for practical purposes
(helping us find food and shelter and avoid dangers) but also
for epistemic matters (helping us learn, form beliefs, and plan).
Interoception, on the other hand, concerns the present state of
our bodies. It is simply not in the business of directly reporting
on what’s going on in the external environment. Instead, this sys-
tem is wholly concerned with regulating the present state of the
body.
I want to focus on the defense of the view that thermoreception
is interoceptive found in Craig (2002).
Craig suggests on the basis of physiological and functional
connections that the thermal system should be categorized as
part of the interoceptive system; that it tells us more about
the present state of our bodies than it does about the exter-
nal world (and that it does the latter only as a kind of sec-
ondary function). In doing so, it functions to maintain balance
in our bodily system, and it does so in a way very similar
to the operation of other homeostatic systems like those for
hunger, thirst, and pain (see also Nakamura andMorrison, 2007).
Here Craig (2002) describes the interoceptive system (emphasis
mine):
This system is a homeostatic afferent pathway that conveys signals
from small-diameter primary afferents that represent the physio-
logical status of all tissues of the body. It projects first to autonomic
and homeostatic centers in the spinal cord and brainstem, thereby
providing the long-missing afferent complement of the efferent
autonomic nervous system. Together with afferent activity that
is relayed by the nucleus of the solitary tract (NTS), it generates
a direct thalamocortical representation of the state of the body
in primates that is crucial for temperature, pain, itch and other
5It is interesting to compare this with the distinction between emotional and
discriminative touch (McGlone et al., 2007). These categories overlap in sev-
eral respects; indeed, McGlone et al. (2007) use some of Craig’s findings
and terminology to help mark the difference between emotional and dis-
criminative. However, they note some interesting cases of overlap between
physiologically distinct afferent populations (p. 176), and, as we’ll see, they
end up defending a dualist (i.e., pluralist) view of touch.
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somatic feelings. This anatomical organization shows that these
feelings are highly resolved, sensory aspects of ongoing homeosta-
sis that represent the physiological condition of the body itself—a
distinct shift from the concept that pain and temperature are aspects
of touch (p. 655).
Notice that the key evidence for lumping these elements together
into a single system are physiological. On my view, as we’ll
see, this is a perfectly appropriate context for categorizing these
constituent systems. It just isn’t the only such context.
While debates continue about whether hunger, thirst, and pain
should be seen as perceptual (see e.g., Aydede, 2009), there is little
debate about whether they represent something external to the
body. On nearly all views, when we feel hungry, we are learn-
ing something about the present physiological state of our bodies
rather than something about the external environment.
But why think that our thermoreceptive system (or rather
many of its constituent parts) can play only one role, and must
be either interoceptive or exteroceptive? Amuch better alternative
here is to go pluralist: Craig is correct that there are explanatory
schemes according to which it makes most sense to classify ther-
moreception along with other systems of bodily awareness like
hunger and thirst. As Nakamura and Morrison (2007) write:
To evoke behavioral, autonomic, somatic and hormonal responses
that counteract changes in environmental temperature before they
affect body core temperature, thermoregulatory command neu-
rons in the POA [the preoptic area] need to receive feedforward
signaling of environmental temperature information from skin
thermoreceptors through the spinal and trigeminal dorsal horns
(p. 62).
Thermoreceptors, when they project to the POA and other areas
that control homeostatic control, play a critical role in regulat-
ing our overall body temperature. We can recognize this without
denying that we can also directly sense thermal features of the
external environment when, for instance, our cutaneous ther-
moreceptors are co-activated with other constituents of externally
directed haptic perception, whose afferents project directly to
other areas of the somatosensory cortex.
Let’s consider this second role in more detail 6 . When we
actively explore an object with our hands, for instance, the
synchronized motor engagement and cutaneous activation gen-
erate awareness of external objects and their thermal properties
(Fulkerson, 2014b). This is, after all, how we successfully check
whether the bath water is too hot, or whether the white wine is
sufficiently chilled (cf. Jones and Lederman, 2006).
When we touch the bath water, we are attempting to deter-
mine the thermal state of the water. We reach our hand (or
wrist, elbow, etc.) into the water, feel its temperature, and then
decide whether or not the water is too hot. When we feel that
the water is merely warm, we seem to succeed just fine in
determining something about the state of the world, and not
simply through some kind of explicit inference (Schepers and
Ringkamp, 2010). Our experience is, it seems, about the state
6I set aside for now the details concerning the role of thermoreception in
nociception.
of the water. I’ve already suggested a functional reason for this:
the activated thermoreceptors are not acting or interpreted on
their own; they are temporally and spatially aligned with our
exploratory actions and other cutaneous afferents in a way that
unifies and enriches their informational content. This point can
be supplemented by the fact that thermal properties bind to
other external properties, forming complex tangible blends that
involve the association of distinct distal properties. Thermal prop-
erties, for instance, turn out to be one of the essential elements
in our experience of wetness (Sullivan, 1923; Ackerley et al.,
2012) and material composition (Jones and Lederman, 2006),
allowing us to differentiate an equally smooth wooden surface
from a metal one. As Ackerley et al. (2012, p. 73) note: “Skin
afferents are rarely composed of just one sensory modality and
some sensory receptors are polymodal. Furthermore, perception
of the sensation usually occurs from a blend of inputs, for exam-
ple, when we sense that something is wet, it is typically due to
changes in both touch and temperature afferents. There is no
evidence to suggest that we have wetness receptors in the skin.”
While these researchers often speak of touch and temperature
awareness as separate things, their own evidence suggests other-
wise. Relative to a purely physiological criteria, we can categorize
touch and temperature as separate modalities, but when they
function reliably to bring awareness of wetness and material com-
position they are better categorized as part of a single haptic
system7. This is because material composition is one of the most
important elements in tactual object-recognition (Klatzky and
Lederman, 2008). None of these would be the case if thermal
reception only informed us of the state of our bodies, or if external
awareness involved a separate inferential step beyond the sen-
sory level. Indeed, this issue is not unique to thermal awareness,
since touch itself involves a great variety of distinct receptor types,
projection sites, and downstream behavioral and psychological
effects. As McGlone et al. (2007) end their discussion:
In conclusion, a dual role for touch serving both a discrimina-
tive and an affective role in human behavior has been described.
The human hand has clearly evolved to perform a wide range
of exploratory and manipulative tasks, and far surpasses this
function in any other primate (p. 181).
So we can see that the thermoceptive system really does play (at
least) dual roles in creatures like us. In addition, of course, the
use of physiological and functional criteria to categorize the var-
ious constituents of the interoceptive system brings together a
diverse range of systems that cross-cut in other interesting ways.
While Craig suggests that all of these interoceptive systems have
affective valence, for instance, so too do most externally-directed
perceptual systems. Seeing something gruesome or disgusting
often brings a strong emotional reaction. Vision and audition
also play an important role in proprioception and wayfind-
ing (Campos et al., 2012). While several of these systems also
7Indeed, I would argue that our tendency to talk of “thermoreception” and
“touch” as unified entities also involves eliding important physiological and
functional differences between the large number of distinct receptor popula-
tions involved in each system. We’ll return to this general tendency in a later
section.
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have some homeostatic function, they also differ in many other
respects. The idea that there is a single “interoceptive system”
is itself a useful explanatory context. We should not at all be
surprised that there will be equally useful alternative ways of
categorizing these systems.
Contrast Craig’s view with that of Akins (1996). Like Craig,
she denies that the senses are always in the business of veridically
reporting on conditions external to an organism8.
She describes the traditional naturalistic account of senses, one
that she will go on to deny, as follows: “The senses show the brain,
otherwise blind, how things stand “out there,” both in the exter-
nal world and in its own distal body” (p. 342). Later, she adds:
“On the traditional picture, then, the senses, using a system of
signals that capture the structure of a domain of external prop-
erties, tell the brain, without exaggeration or omission, “what is
where” (p. 344).
This traditional (though still prevalent) view can motivate the
idea that the senses have a single, hard-wired role to play (i.e.,
reporting external conditions directly to the brain). Conveniently
for my purposes, she argues against this view with a detailed
consideration of the peripheral thermoreceptive system. On the
traditional view, “The receptors . . .must react with a unique sig-
nal, one that correlates with a particular temperature state.” (p.
342). Of course, this is not how peripheral thermoreceptors func-
tion. They have highly context sensitive and variable response
rates that depend on the present state of the skin and embedded
receptors, the context of activation, and the homeostatic needs of
the organism (consider as Akins does the contrasting experiences
generated by placing a warmed and a chilled hand in a neutral
glass of water).
These facts lead Akins to suggest that sensory systems are “nar-
cissistic”: while they sometimes convey information about the
external environment, they always do so in a way that reflects
first and foremost the needs and priorities of the organism. These
needs, in turn, are often variable and highly context-sensitive.
The senses involve many interacting parts, playing many dif-
ferent and important roles, but always for the organism. This
perspective supports Craig’s insights about the homeostatic and
internally-directed nature of interoceptive thermal responses.
Interoceptive contents, after all, will almost by definition be
narcissistic. However, once the peripheral transducers are seen
correctly as the initial components of much larger downstream
neural networks subserving a variety of distinct psychological and
behavioral activities, we can more easily see how the several chan-
nels involved in thermoreception can, in different contexts, and
when connected with different downstream systems, be (literally)
a part of several distinct sensory systems9.
The upshot then is not that Craig is wrong to apply the
interoceptive category to some sensory systems. It’s that he can
be correct that there is an interesting and important way of
connecting these systems, without excluding alternative ways of
categorizing them. On the moderate pluralist view I will go on
8Her focus is on sensory contents rather than processing, but the general point
is the same.
9I am grateful here to Kathleen Akins for extremely helpful discussion of this
material.
to defend, we can allow that thermal perception plays multiple
different roles. Indeed, we can think of this system as a single sys-
tem only by applying such a scheme of classification. There are
a variety of distinct overlapping systems involved in thermore-
ception, and there are thus many different ways of classifying
them. There is, on my view, both an internal and an externally-
directed role. Thermoreception really is an important part of
touch. It really is a part of our pain system. It really is part of
bodily awareness. Which aspect we focus on depends on which
aspects of the system we’re interested in, and our explanatory
purposes.
One thing is clear: even if one of the key functions of ther-
mal perception is to provide information about the present state
of our bodies, it does not follow that this is the only thing that
thermal perception does. Or at least, it does not follow that
there aren’t multiple variants of thermal systems, all making
use of the very same initial populations of peripheral thermore-
ceptors. One provides bodily information, another is connected
with our haptic exploratory system, another plays a critical role
in our pain experiences. Given this possibility, which I take
to be an actuality, one should not make any inferences about
perception generally on the basis of one function of thermal
experience.
The upshot for us is that Craig highlights only one of the key
functions of the thermal system, and his work allows us to see
how (parts of) the same system can serve a variety of distinct
roles. Some forms of thermal awareness only deliver awareness
of the present state of our bodies; others inform us of the ther-
mal properties of objects in our immediate environment. The
real nature of thermoreception depends on what we are trying
to explain, and on which associated features of the systems we are
categorizing.
Thermoreception represents a kind of ideal case study here: it
is a complex system, but well enough understood that we can use
it to see exactly how plausible and powerful themoderate pluralist
view can be. Now I will fill in the details of the sort of view I have
in mind, starting with some essential background.
3. THE IMPORTANCE OF MULTISENSORY INTERACTION
Recall the statements that began this paper: (i) We have many
senses; (ii) They often interact.
These two statements were for a long time discounted by
those in the cognitive sciences. Many had what O’Callaghan
(2007, 2008) has called a “visuocentric” conception of perceptual
experience. Visual experience was discussed to the exclusion of
other modalities, and it was tacitly assumed that the conclusions
reached for visual experiences would translate smoothly over to
the other senses.
Recent work in cognitive science has accepted a more nuanced,
multisensory conception of perceptual experience10. Empirically
informed philosophy of mind has similarly seen a transformation
in our understanding of perception11. Recent philosophy has seen
10The literature here is enormous; a good place to start is Stein (2012).
11The transition in philosophy was largely spearheaded by O’Callaghan (2008,
2007). Evans (1982) and Martin (1992) are other important early sources. For
the most recent treatment, see the articles in Bennett and Hill (2014).
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a increase in research on other modalities12, sensory interactions13,
and on the individuation of the senses14.
Of course, much of this philosophical work has been informed
by and is directly responding to work in the various cognitive
sciences exploring the deep interconnections and interactions
between the senses.
Researchers have focused extensively on many different ele-
ments of sensory interaction, from cross-modal illusions, in
which activations in one modality alter or suppress activations in
another, to other categories of interaction like sensory facilitation,
dominance, and several distinct forms of sensory integration. An
increasing focus recently has been on more complex instances of
sensory interaction like those occurring in affective experience,
cognitive penetration, and synesthesia15. In all cases, researchers
have extensively documented deep and pervasive interactions
between sensory modalities.
These discoveries have largely undercut the “visuocentric”
assumptions found in earlier research, and challenge many sim-
plistic conceptions of sensory experience. Of course, one can still
find work devoted entirely to vision (and to other individual
modalities), but now such work is typically much more self-
conscious about the limitations of focusing on a single modality
studied in isolation. This recent shift has brought with it many
important advances in our understanding of sensory interactions
and the nature of perceptual consciousness, and has been a good
thing for those of us trying to better understand the nature of
perception.
As with any large shift in the scientific landscape, the new
multisensory focus has also raised a number of important the-
oretical questions and posed novel challenges. I want to suggest
that the move from our prior conception of separate individual
senses requires more thanmerely investigating non-visual modal-
ities or considering some sensory interactions. The move to a
multisensory framework requires a more substantial reorienta-
tion of the theoretical landscape and of our investigative practices.
At the same time, we should resist the urge to completely abandon
all talk of senses and sensory systems. Instead, I will argue for
an intermediate view that rejects any single, unified account of
sensory modalities and their interactions, instead embracing a
multitude of such accounts.
Before discussing these details, it’s necessary to make two
caveats. First, my focus in this paper is on the cognitive science
classification of sensory systems.When I talk about vision or audi-
tion, I’m primarily interested in how we individuate and classify
for the purposes of scientific explanation a particular part of our
12See for instance, recent work on smell (Batty, 2010; Richardson, 2011);
on taste (Smith, 2009, 2012); on sounds (Nudds, 2001; Matthen, 2010), and
on touch (O’Shaughnessy, 1989; Scott, 2001; Ratcliffe, 2008; Richardson,
2013; Fulkerson, 2014b). In addition, there has been work on many forms
of experience outside the traditional five senses, for instance on temporal
experience (Grush, 2005; Phillips, 2008; Lee, 2014) and on bodily awareness
(de Vignemont, 2007; Schwenkler, 2011).
13O’Callaghan (2012); Macpherson (2011); Bennett and Hill (2014)
14See for example Keeley (2002); Gray (2005); Nudds (2003); Macpherson
(2010); Matthen (in press).
15See for example Mroczko-Wasowicz and Nikolic (2014); Vuilleumier and
Driver (2007); Stokes (2012); Siegel (2011); Villemure et al. (2003).
psychological biology. I am interested in the systems on the plau-
sible assumption that it is those systems that are the constitutive
and computational basis of the experiences generated16.
While this is a substantive assumption, the pluralist view does
not depend on it (see the discussion of sensory substitution in
§7.4 where this commitment is eased). It is an important advan-
tage of my view that it allows and indeed embraces the idea that
our perceptual experiences can be investigated and understood in
multiple ways. So while the discussion that follows focuses almost
exclusively on the sensory systems underlying our perceptual
experiences rather than on their phenomenological, dynamic, or
epistemic features, the view is ultimately sympathetic to many
seemingly different approaches to understanding perceptual
experience17.
Second, pluralist views have been discussed in a range of areas,
especially in philosophy of biology (Kitcher, 1984; Mishler and
Brandon, 1987; Ereshefsky, 1992; Steel, 2004; Cleland, 2013),
but also in cognitive science (Dale et al., 2009), in general
philosophy of science (Cartwright, 1999; Mitchell, 2002), aes-
thetics (Mag Uidhir and Magnus, 2011), and elsewhere. The
view I defend in what follows was not initially inspired by
this general move toward pluralism. Instead, it arose as a spe-
cific reaction to recent work on sensory interactions. It is not,
therefore, the application of a form of pluralism defended in
another domain to the sensory case. Instead, the view is moti-
vated entirely by considerations internal to issues of explaining
sensory interaction. For this reason, in what follows I will not
engage in any systematic examination or comparisons between
sensory pluralism and the many similar views defended in
other domains, nor do I claim any special affiliation with such
views.
4. THEORETICAL OPTIONS
In this section, I want to spell out in general terms the nature of
the tension forced on us by themove to amultisensory conception
of perception, and consider the theoretical options.
We start with assumption (i) that we have many senses. An
implicit assumption here is that these senses are more or less self-
contained entities (it doesn’t matter whether we think of them
16While my own preference is for representational and computational
approaches to the mind, this assumption is not intended to rule out
approaches to cognition and perception that emphasize the strong connec-
tions between this biology and the external world. For instance, it should not
be taken to exclude views like those recently defended by Noë (2004); Hurley
(1998); Thompson (2007). Indeed, as I say in the text, it is an advantage of
my position that it leaves space for a variety of explanatory approaches to
the study of perceptual experience, including embodied and enactive views.
For example, my view leaves space for contexts in which a view of modality
along the lines defended by McGann (2010) is appropriate. (A critical dif-
ference is that McGann’s view is strongly eliminativist, holding that “there is
no such thing as an experience that is purely visual, auditory, or otherwise
modal” (p. 72). By my lights, whether there are such experiences is dependent
on the explanatory context, and what we mean by “visual,” “auditory,” and the
like.)
17Though I should emphasize that, in my own view, such approaches
are useless unless constrained and informed by the empirical
facts.
www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1426 | 5
Fulkerson Rethinking sensory systems
at this point as systems, modes of awareness, or forms of expe-
rience, etc.). One monist view that has been very influential is
the claim that the senses are modular input systems (Fodor, 1983;
Pylyshyn, 2006). On this view, the senses are domain specific,
informationally encapsulated, hard-wired, and fast systems that
function to process incoming sensory information. According to
the modular account, we have a strong physiological, informa-
tional, functional, and computational distinction between sen-
sory modalities. Vision uses different biological hardware than
audition, to carry different information, for different computa-
tional and behavioral purposes18. The modular account is just one
influential monist accounts in the literature. Its strength is sup-
plemented by our strong intuitive sense that the senses represent
very different forms of conscious awareness. What could be more
clear than the difference between seeing something and hear-
ing something? The view, and other weaker versions of monism,
are systematically unable to adjust to the known facts about
sensory interactions. This brings us to our second beginning
statement.
That our senses interact (ii) seriously undermines any monist
conception of sensory modality and interaction. We have learned
that the senses interact in many interesting ways, often com-
pletely hidden from introspection. It has taken careful investiga-
tion to realize just how pervasive these influences can be. Much
has been made, rightly, about the existence of cross-modal illu-
sions (O’Callaghan, 2008). The McGurk effect shows that very
often, what we hear is determined by what we see McGurk and
MacDonald (1976); Skipper et al. (2007). The motion-bounce
illusion shows that what we see is often party determined by
what we hear (Sekuler et al., 1997). The use of brain scans
and single-recording techniques has shown that many distinct
areas of sensory cortex are active and engaged in the generation
of experiences in single modalities (Ghazanfar and Schroeder,
2006). Similarly, vestibular and proprioceptive information influ-
ences activations in other modalities (Frissen et al., 2011; Campos
et al., 2012). Motor movements influence cutaneous activations
(Chapman, 1994). Thermal receptors influence pressure aware-
ness (Jones and Lederman, 2006). What we see influences what
we smell (Herz and von Clef, 2001). And on and on.
Once we realize just how pervasive and varied these inter-
actions can be, we really start to lose grip on our what these
separate senses involved are supposed to be. If they are not
domain-specific, if they are not physiologically and information-
ally isolated, if they serve many varied and interactive functions, if
the experiences they generate are fused into complexes that aren’t
easily decomposed or isolated in experience, then in what sense
are they really distinct sensory systems at all? They certainly aren’t
isolated or independent. The facts of sensory interaction make it
a very difficult theoretical challenge to say exactly what the senses
referred to in (i) might actually be. Depending on how we think
about multisensory interactions, it can become difficult to avoid
18Keeley (2002) can be read in some ways as regimenting many of these cri-
teria as a means of individuating sensory modalities. In my view it is the
strongest statement of sensory monism, but as it predates the current interest
in multisensory perception, it does not even make an attempt to incorporate
facts about sensory interactions.
the conclusion that we really don’t have separate senses after all.
Vision becomes a complex of various subsystems, each connected
in various ways with many other sensory subsystems and aspects
of cognition. Instead, we just have a vast mess of sensory interac-
tions (maybe at the lowest level of sensory subsystems)19. I am not
the first to notice these challenges. Consider the recent paper by
Deroy et al. (2014), where they lay out many of the challenges fac-
ing the move to a multisensory conception of perception. As they
note, there seem to be at present no clear experimental methods
to directly investigate multisensory awareness or to distinguish
between various models of sensory interaction. This problem
is compounded, I believe, by appeal to several distinct forms
of sensory interaction, including distinct levels of investigation
(at the neurophysiological, behavioral, and introspective levels)
and different forms of interaction (cross-modal influences, sen-
sory blends, multimodal conjunctions). They are asking the right
questions:
Can we simply take the current theories and protocols used to try
and understand unisensory cases and then import them into the
field of multisensory research? This is the approach that we wish
to question here . . . shifting to multisensory cases is not cost-free
for the study of perceptual awareness. It introduces both method-
ological and theoretical pressures. (Deroy et al., 2014, p. 3).
These pressures are compounded by the diversity of theoretical
questions and experimental methods involved in these investiga-
tions. As they note later, “The recycling of unisensory protocols is
unlikely to provide good ways to study multisensory awareness, if
there is indeed such a thing” (Deroy et al., 2014, p. 8).My proposal
suggests that these difficulties are not simply temporary impedi-
ments in our understanding of sensory awareness; they are the
inevitable result of trying to fit a heterogeneous class of interac-
tions under a single category (either unisensory vs multisensory,
full stop). Consider a simplified example to support this claim.
Suppose that we are thinking about sensory interactions as
occurring fundamentally between informational systems, and we
characterize these (roughly) in terms of informational process-
ing. If we do this, we can think about the interactions of the
senses as constituted by the sharing and interaction among sep-
arate informational channels (for details on how this might go,
see my 2011). What happens immediately, however, is that vision
and audition no longer constitute anything like a single coher-
ent sensory modality. They are complex systems that themselves
involve interactions among disparate sensory subsystems sharing
information in lots of interesting ways. This happens for any other
criteria we try to use to define sensory modalities 20.
Since the interactions that operate in vision cross all kinds of
boundaries, it becomes difficult to make sense of what counts as
the visual system. Do those auditory processing centers that func-
tion reliably and consistently to contribute to the nature of our
visual experiences count as part of vision? What about the perva-
sive influence of vestibular and proprioceptive systems on vision?
And what do wemean by visual experiences? Once you start taking
19A view like this seems to be advocated by Shimojo and Shams (2001).
20See Fulkerson (2011) for one elaboration of this claim.
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seriously the fact that the senses interact, and you start looking at
the details of these interactions, it can be incredibly difficult to
make sense of what we’re actually talking about. The very idea of
a visual system, or of a visual experience, starts to break down. So
the worries we encountered with thermoreception are not unique
to that domain; they are pervasive issues that arise for all putative
perceptual modalities21.
As I see it, there are three ways to settle respond to this ten-
sion. We can preserve and supplement the status quo through
some form of sensory monism, we can reject the entire project
of sensory classification and go eliminativist, or we can go
pluralist 22.
4.1. OPTION ONE
We can reject the claim that there is any tension or threat to
the notion of a sensory modality posed by pervasive sensory
interactions. One could, for instance, maintain the notion of the
individual senses and try to explain multisensory interactions
in ways that don’t challenge the orthodox view of the senses.
Connolly (2014) makes such an argument. In my commentary
on Connolly’s paper (Fulkerson, 2014a), I called such a view sen-
sory conservatism; however, in this context I would describe it as
a form of sensory monism. The idea is that we find some unified
account that preserves the traditional notion of separate sensory
modalities. Part of what this means is that we account for the wide
range of sensory interactions by appeal to a criteria of sensory
interaction that is independent from our criteria for being a sen-
sory modality. We find a way to show that the traditional five (or
more) senses remain of explanatory importance, and we account
for multisensory interactions in a way that doesn’t undermine
these very kinds.
This is not an easy thing to pull off. For one, no one has yet
suggested a criterion of sensory individuation that preserves the
notion in the light of pervasive sensory interactions. The senses,
whatever they are, cannot be domain specific, or functionally-
unified, or marked in phenomenology, or physiologically spec-
ified, since what we call vision and audition and touch and
olfaction and gustation have none of these features23.
4.2. OPTION TWO
Instead of sensory monism, one could opt for eliminativism. One
could hold that the traditional senses (and their various interac-
tions) are a kind of false construct or simplified idealization, and
propose that we reject all such talk from our theorizing. Recent
21I want to emphasize that, while I speak here and throughout about the clas-
sification of sensory modalities, my target is broader than issues about the
individuation of the senses. My primary concern, in fact, concerns how best
to classify and understand lower level interactions between the senses.
22This list is not exhaustive; there could be various forms of hybrid view in
the area. I have difficulty imagining any hybrid view that was not consistent
with the moderate pluralism I’m advocating here.
23I have defended the idea that our best account of the individual modalities is
that they are collections of sensory subsystems that function together to group
or bind sets of sensory features together (Fulkerson, 2014a,b). This claim was
made in the context of sensory pluralism: this is just one way to categorize
the subsystems that make up vision. In many other respects, vision really is
multisensory. On my view, it really is both, depending on what framework of
investigation we are using.
advances have demonstrated that our experience of the world is
generated by a large number of interacting processing units. The
natural way of thinking about sensory systems, on this view, is at
a much finer grain than anything like modalities. Modalities are
huge, messy collections of complex systems that involvemutually-
interacting connections with numerous areas of the brain. They
aren’t natural kinds at all. On this view, to take the idea of sensory
interactions seriously requires a much more radical shift in our
thinking than we might have originally expected. In fact, it seems
to require a rejection of (i). That is, it seems we ought to reject
our intuitive notion of separate sensory modalities, and under-
stand sensory interactions as pervasive “all the way down.” In the
end, there really are no senses. This view has been defended most
explicitly by Shimojo and Shams (2001), and one can see echoes
of it in the work of many others (e.g., Driver and Spence, 2000;
O’Callaghan, 2008).
4.3. OPTION THREE
Instead of adopting monism or eliminativism, I argue instead
that we should adopt sensory pluralism. This is the view that
there are indeed separate modalities, and natural ways of carv-
ing up sensory systems and their interactions, just like the monist
believes; but like the eliminativist, the pluralist holds that no sin-
gle account of modality and interaction is forthcoming. Against
these views, the pluralist holds that there are many criteria of
sensory interaction and unity, and these criteria in turn partly
depend on our explanatory purposes and the investigative con-
text. In other words, we should be pluralists about the senses and
their interactions.
While some versions of pluralism can involve a radical ontol-
ogy, the moderate view I have in mind is neither radical nor
ontologically profligate. It simply holds that sensory systems are
complexes that can be fruitfully engaged in many ways. Instead
of calling it pluralism, one could, following Evans (1982) on
reference, simply catalog and describe the variety of sensory inter-
actions. Or, like Matthen (2010), one could focus on the diversity
of sensory classification. These differences in terms do not track
a real difference in the view I have in mind. I simply use the label
sensory pluralism to name the view that sensory interactions come
in many different forms, and therefore do not form a (single)
natural kind.
My brand of sensory pluralism is moderate and constrained
by the fact that there are indeed better and worse ways of divid-
ing sensory interactions (more strongly: there are legitimate and
illegitimate forms of sensory classification). Yet among the good
ways, there are multiple equally useful options relative to our
purposes. These cross-classify our perceptual systems in ways
that can seem deeply at odds with each other, though in reality
they enrich and mutually support our understanding of sensory
experience. For instance, we can investigate as a single entity
the causal-detection system composed of several seemingly dis-
tinct sensory modalities (Michotte, 1963). There is a legitimate
theoretical and empirical question about whether this system of
classification really is legitimate (as far as know, the jury is still
out on this question). The pluralism I defend is thus modest
rather than revisionary: it acknowledges the inherent complexity
and deep interconnections between sensory systems at different
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processing levels, yet maintains that within this complexity there
can be multiple robust explanatory systems of classification. We
can, for instance, acknowledge in one explanatory context that all
perception is inherently multisensory, while genuinely allowing
in other contexts that some of our experiences are unisensory. My
view is that what counts as a good classification of sensory interac-
tion partly depends on the explanatory context. Hence “moderate
sensory pluralism.”
In the next section, I want to highlight those general features of
pluralist systems that ground legitimate schemes of classification,
and support their explanatory utility.
5. THE CASE FOR PLURALISM
I put forward here some general claims in defense of the kind
of moderate pluralism I have mind. This will necessarily be
a simplified discussion concerning various explanatory strate-
gies we might take with respect to a domain. There are many
discussions of pluralism in the literature, and the basic ten-
ants are well understood. As Mitchell (2002, p. 55) remarks,
“The “fact” of pluralism in science is no surprise. On scanning
contemporary journals, books, and conference topics in some
sciences, one is struck by the multiplicity of models, theoreti-
cal approaches, and explanations.” This seems especially true of
cognitive science (Dale, 2008; Dale et al., 2009). And, I shall
argue, it is also the way we ought to be thinking about sensory
interactions.
There are some general formal features that any complex sys-
tem subject to moderate pluralism should exhibit. These are
decomposition, functional overlap, and bounded recombination. We
can find analogs of these features in something as simple as a
Necker cube (see Figure 2).
The Necker Cube is a basic, simplified model of the kind of
pluralist view I have in mind: it has constituent parts (decom-
position). These parts in turn equally satisfy two inconsistent
high-level descriptions, and they do so because any particular part
FIGURE 2 | Necker cube.
(a line or intersection) can play more than one role (functional
overlap). There are also limits to the shapes that the cube can take
on (bounded recombination); while there are multiple ways of
seeing the cube, these ways are highly constrained24.
Look at the point in the upper corner of the image picked out
by the arrow. According to one high-level description, the point
is a front-facing top corner of a cube. According to the other, it
is a rear-facing point on the bottom corner of the cube. Which is
correct? Well, the natural answer is both, depending on how the
cube is seen. The parts themselves don’t settle the answer since
they are consistent with both views. The lines and points on the
page satisfy two distinct high-level descriptions. These are highly
constrained descriptions: there are only two of them for these
points, and they are very precise. In fact, fixing the high-level
description completely fixes the role played by these elements. In
context, there are correct and incorrect descriptions of these fea-
tures. Many options for this point are completely ruled out: this
particular point cannot be a rear-facing top corner. Nor can it stop
being a point, and so on.
In this very basic example we can see the features of a moderate
form of pluralism, one without problematic metaphysical com-
mitments. Let us take these simple lessons and formalize them a
bit for proper application to the sensory domain.
5.1. DECOMPOSITION
Let’s start with decomposition. It is not enough that a system has
parts, but that it has functionally salient parts. This means that
the system must have some functional decomposition. I am being
intentionally broad about my use of “function” here. The parts of
sensory systems I’m interested in play different causal, informa-
tional, mechanical, computational, and structural roles. As might
be suspected from this list, I’m not here interested in, and nothing
in my view hangs on, defending a particular theoretical account
of function25. The only constraint is that the relevant notion of
function not be sensitive to our interpretive or conventional uses.
There must be some actual intrinsic basis on which the low-level
functions are assigned26. I have in mind something like a “natural”
or “proper” function, though very broadly construed (for a dis-
cussion of function in this sense, see Dretske, 1991 and Millikan,
1989).
A system is functionally decompositional—in the broad sense
of function alluded to above—just in case its operation can be
broken down into simpler parts that operate separately from the
24I’m using the Necker cube here as a basic model to point out those features
of sensory systems that make them amenable to a pluralist view. Obviously,
the analogy is not perfect. In particular, the cube lacks the required functional
complexity, and its competing views are not sensitive to the explanatory con-
text. Still, I think it is a useful toy example for clarifying the view I actually
have in mind. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify
this point.
25There is, of course, a very large literature on the nature of function and
mechanism in the special sciences (especially cognitive science and biology).
For a very brief introduction, see Bechtel (2008); Cummins (1985); Machamer
et al. (2000); Feest (2003); Millikan (1989)
26Consider again the Necker cube. While it’s high level description depends
on the visual context, the status of the lines and points on the page do not
depend on the context. Each cube can be broken down into distinct functional
complexes (corners and sides and edges, etc.).
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other constituent parts27 . In other words, the complex system
needs to be composed of parts that have a specifiable functional
identity. A simple feature, like a point in space, or a complex
object with lots of parts that each play no distinctive functional
role, does not admit of the kind of moderate pluralism I have in
mind. A hunk of iron for instance, is not subject to this sort of plu-
ralism. It is surely a natural kind, one that can be used to do lots of
different things28. There are versions of pluralism that would apply
to hunks of iron (Havstad, 2014), but for my purposes it doesn’t
count because its parts and their functions are too simple to admit
of multiple appropriate schemes of scientific classification.
This should not be surprising: work in the metaphysics of
mind has long recognized that psychological systems require
a minimal level of functional complexity29 . Some enti-
ties simply do not have the structure or complexity nec-
essary to allow for equally robust categorization at high
levels30.
Such decomposition is a necessary condition, but not a suf-
ficient one. Just because something can be broken down into
functional parts, it does not follow that we should be pluralists
about its high-level nature. Another feature is needed, and that is
functional overlap.
5.2. FUNCTIONAL OVERLAP
A pluralist friendly systemmust have a minimal level of complex-
ity. In addition, however, the relationship between the constituent
parts is also important. In particular, those functional parts
should each contribute to distinct high-level systems.
It’s unlikely that a system that had single-function parts (or
more accurately, parts that contributed only to a single more
complex system) could generate any interesting form of plural-
ism. This is simply because there would be only a single role
played by that part, and so only a limited number of ways to
reconceive its role in the larger system. Think about the cut-
ting wheel on a can opener. It is an essential constituent part
of the opener that plays a specialized functional role. So we
have decomposition. But there’s only the one role for the cutting
wheel to play. It doesn’t serve any other purpose, or contribute
in different ways to different complexes at higher levels of the
27In Fulkerson (2011) I discuss a version of this view, which I called the func-
tional dissociation criterion. The notion I’m using here is broader than what I
had in mind previously.
28Perhaps this is a good place to note that what I have in mind differs sig-
nificantly from the notion of multiple realizability in the cognitive sciences.
The idea here isn’t that the “same high level description” can be realized by
different underlying constituents as in multiple realization, but that the very
same set of underlying constituents can be parts of equally salient, but dis-
tinct high-level systems. My view is thus something closer to the converse of
multiple realizability.
29See for instance, see the discussion in Block (1997) concerning the “Disney
Principle,” the idea that in the real world, anything with a mind needs to have
a minimal level of complexity (unlike the sentient teapots and spoons in the
world of cartoons). These debates arise in several domains, involving debates
about reduction, emergence, and the relationship between low-level realizers
and high-level descriptions (Batterman, 2000).
30It is of course my view, given the above, that there are several distinct
notions of pluralism and that we need to be careful not to assume that they
are equivalent.
can-opener. It’s therefore difficult to suggest that our under-
standing and classification of the can opener varies in any way
with the explanatory context31 . Typically speaking, it doesn’t.
Only when the parts start to take on multiple roles will we
start to see interesting ways of combining them into higher level
systems.
Think again about the toy example of the Necker cube. Each
point on the page functions both as a facing side and a rear side,
depending on the view taken. That single point on the page (or
the screen) plays both roles. If there were not some functional
overlap, then there would not be multiple perspectives available
on the cube as a whole. The parts serve dual functions, and we
are able to see them play these different roles in distinct high-level
structures. What role it plays thus depends on which high-level
structure we’re interested in (more on this soon).
5.3. LIMITED RECOMBINATION
The final feature is limited recombination. We can think of this as
an upper bound on our pluralism. There are many ways of being
a sensory system, on my view. And so our theoretical accounts of
such systems are open to several distinct systems of classification.
And yet, despite the existence of multiple forms of sensory inter-
action and methods of classification, these are highly constrained.
There are clear limits on the roles played by the constituent parts
and on the larger systems in which they participate. The view is
not “anything goes.” This is what makes this form of pluralism
moderate. There are clear objective constraints that ground the
admissible conceptions of the constituent systems32.
While one can look at themarks of the Necker cube on the page
and see distinct but legitimate shapes represented, one cannot
find spheres or other shapes in the mix. The objective locations
of the points and lines rule out most shape interpretations. So
there are clear constraints on how we understand this relatively
simple system. Not only does this make the view ontologically
moderate, it is also what makes the multiple views explana-
tory. The claim is not that sensory systems can be understood
however we like, or that there are not facts of the matter con-
cerning the natures of sensory interactions. Instead, the idea is
that there are multiple, objectively robust roles played by the con-
stituent elements of sensory systems, and so for any particular
constituent subsystem, there will be more than one role it plays
in distinct higher-level systems, but not an unlimited number of
such roles. As we’ve seen, this perfectly describes the peripheral
thermoreceptor system. This system contributes to pain aware-
ness and is thus part of the nociceptive system. It also contributes
to object recognition and externally-directed thermal awareness,
and so it is also an essential part of the sense of touch. It also
plays an important role (along with central thermoreceptors)
in the regulation of body temperature, and so is part of our
31Of course, this is a bit simplified. Maybe for some explanatory purposes the
material composition of the cutting wheel matters (why did it rust?), for others
it might be its size or shape (why won’t it cut this can?). These points suggest
that pluralism is a robust phenomenon throughout our explanatory practices.
The present point is that, above and beyond these basic forms of explanatory
pluralism, sensory systems exhibit an additional layer of complexity.
32Compare the sorting and motivating principles discussed by Ereshefsky
(1992).
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homeostatic regulatory system (along with thirst and hunger).
There is no single classification of these peripheral thermore-
ceptor populations, because they play many varied roles in our
lives.
We can now see that certain complex systems are amenable
to a modest pluralist view. To suggest that a single complex sys-
tem can be understood and classified in multiple ways does not
commit us to a problematic ontology. We can make this clear
by making explicit the contextual operator in our sensory clas-
sification. A claim such as “System X is multisensory” leaves
out this operator, and thus cannot be properly evaluated. It is
not an explanatory statement. Instead, we should be evaluat-
ing claims of the form “System X is multisensory according to
explanatory schema Y.” This schema specifies the respect in which
something counts as multisensory or not. Similarly for other
claims.
Adding this sort of clause will allow researchers to avoid mere
terminological disputes and help clarify the nature of the investi-
gation in question. One worry about pluralist views is that they
can foster confusion and hinder scientific progress. I find com-
pelling the reply in Ereshefsky (1992, p. 680) to such worries
about pluralistic views of species in biology:
[B]iologists should categorize those lineages by the criteria used
to segment them: interbreeding units, monophyletic units, and
ecological units. The term “species” is superfluous beyond the ref-
erence to a segmentation criterion; and when the term is used
alone it leads to confusion. The term “species” has out-lived its
usefulness and should be replaced by terms that more accurately
describe the different types of lineages that biologists refer to as
“species.”
Similarly, philosophers and others talking about sensory expe-
rience should avoid using terms like “multisensory,” “multi-
modal,”or “cross-modal” without being clear about the way in
which they are using those terms. They should not assume that
there is a single, theoretically interesting way in which senses
interact, or that we can have, say, a single unified account of
what qualifies as a “cross-modal” form of interaction. Some inter-
actions are legitimately unisensory, others involve activations of
processing units distributed widely in other systems (and these
often overlap!). There is thus no single way for these systems to
interact; they are complexes that interact in many theoretically
interesting ways.
Putting all of these elements together, we can see that sen-
sory systems should be ideally situated to the kind of pluralistic
view I’ve been outlining. They are, after all, evolved biologi-
cal systems that serve many functions, and are subject to many
constraints. Indeed, all of cognition seems amendable to this per-
spective. As Dale et al. (2009) write: “The mind, as somehow
constituted by brainbodyenvironment interaction, is extraordi-
narily complex. In addition, we have many and assorted interests
in that interaction” (p. 1). And these parts play these roles in a
number of ways, through informational extraction and compu-
tation, through behavioral and bodily features and reactions, and
so on.
6. SENSORY SYSTEMS
It should be clear from the gloss above that sensory systems are
ideal candidates to satisfy all three constraints. If we’ve learned
anything over the last few decades, it’s that our sensory systems
are deeply complex structures that involve a large number of
interacting elements. Very often these elements are put to dif-
ferent uses by various downstream systems. As such, sensory
systems are decomposable into functionally salient parts. These
parts (rods, cones, retinal ganglion cells, etc.) in turn perform dif-
ferent functions depending on which downstream systems they
are contributing to33. And so it should not be surprising that the
explanatory context—the kinds of systems we’re investigating and
what behaviors and capacities we seek to explain—can have a sig-
nificant impact on how the various systems are categorized and
understood.
Even entirely within vision this should be clear. A cone cell
examined in isolation performs one function (converting electro-
magnetic energy into neural signals), but the function it serves
can be influenced by, and in turn influence, other cones connected
to it (for instance, when detecting edges). At higher levels of com-
plexity, these same constituent elements can perform many other
functions. For instance, these early visual elements are essen-
tial parts of a complex object-recognition system, but also play
a role in guiding our motor actions. Recent debates about the
“two visual streams hypothesis” arise partly because of these dual
roles (Milner and Goodale, 1995). Which stream is really vision?
Various options are available here, but taking the pluralist concep-
tion, one can see that we shouldn’t expect a single answer. What
we call “vision” is in reality a complex set of distinct systems and
subsystems. There aremany things that count as vision (this is the
pluralism). Which one is going to be explanatory and relevant for
scientific purposes depends on making clear the explanatory con-
text. Even so, it does not depend entirely on the context; there
are clear objective constraints limiting the ways we can think
about visual experiences. The view is heavily grounded in the
actual capacities and functions of the constituent elements of the
system.
While it strengthens the claims I’ll be making that they mesh
with actual practice in the cognitive sciences, the case for sensory
pluralism doesn’t rest entirely on this descriptive enterprise. It is
neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of sensory pluralism
that researchers engage in these strategies of classification (they
could simply be mistaken in their current practices). My pur-
pose also is similarly not to weigh in on or take sides on these
first-order debates. Instead, the discussion is meant to show how
fruitful, plausible, and powerful the pluralist perspective can be
in helping further our understanding of difficult issues in recent
work on perceptual experience. Moderate sensory pluralism is,
ideally, a form of what Mitchell (2002) calls “compatible plu-
ralism.” On this view, the various explanations involved are not
strict competitors, but mutually supporting accounts of complex
phenomena:
33The notion of “downstream” systems can be deeply misleading. Sensory sys-
tems, like much of cognition, is deeply heterarchical, and involves processing
going in multiple directions at the same time. These complications only add
additional support to the claims made here.
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[C]omplex phenomenon harbor multiple interacting causal pro-
cesses and multiple levels of organization which all may be
involved in the generation of the feature to be explained. By dis-
ambiguating the question to be answered by an explanation–i.e.,
what is the evolutionary origin of a trait or behavior we observe
now—one is still left with a plurality of potential causes acting
at a number of levels of organization which may well constitute
compatible answers to that single question (Mitchell, 2002, p. 57)
We have seen how this perspective enriches our understanding of
the thermoreceptive system. Let us see how it might apply to other
recent debates in the literature34.
7. IMPLICATIONS
I will now briefly discuss some potential applications of the
account described here in several domains of active research on
sensory awareness.
7.1. OLFACTION
The olfactory system is another obvious case where sensory plu-
ralism finds ample support. Intuitively, we believe that we have
a single “sense of smell” and that we can understand the com-
ponents of this system as a single, coherent thing. The reality
is a bit more complicated. We in fact have two senses of smell,
a orthonasal and a retronasal system. The orthonasal system
involves molecules that are picked up in the surrounding envi-
ronment through the nasal cavity, often by exploratory acts of
sniffing (Wilson and Stevenson, 2006). These inputs provide reli-
able information about the nature of environmental chemical
stimulants (See also Batty, 2009). We can even use smell for
wayfinding and to help influence our emotional reactions (Herz,
2007; Rosenblum, 2011).
Retronasal olfaction by contrast involves chemical irritants
that rise from inside the mouth and pass through the olfactory
epithelium from the other direction. Though the initial activa-
tion sites are more or less the same in both instances, the resulting
perceptual experiences and functional interactions are very dif-
ferent from orthonasal ones. Here the smell becomes fused and
combined with other taste information and generates a com-
plex experience of flavor (Auvray and Spence, 2008). So is smell
a unified sensory modality? Is it externally directed? Or is it
part of a multisensory system of flavor detection? According to
the sensory pluralist, the answer is all of the above. The ini-
tial chemoreceptors involved in both systems might be the same,
but they play very different roles when combined with distinct
inputs (external vs internal sources of chemical irritants) and
co-processing elements (sniffing and head movements in exter-
nally directed tasks and coordinated taste and texture activations
in the mouth, respectively). Here again we see that what seems
like a single modality is really a complex collection of interact-
ing elements that can be appropriately classified in a variety of
ways.
34The pluralist view offers a robust explanation for the prevalence of such
debates. More importantly, it suggests a way to move forward on such debates,
as I hope will become clear in each example.
7.2. AUDITORY PROCESSORS
The auditory system also admits of several distinct schemes of
classification: the initial processing units involved in auditory
experience play a role in several interacting systems: general
sound perception, our awareness of speech, and in the perception
of music. There are reasons for thinking of these as very differ-
ent systems, and thus there are multiple ways of classifying and
accounting for our auditory awareness; these ways involve differ-
ent functional roles, associated interactions with other systems,
and behavioral capacities. In addition, of course, we can under-
stand audition as part of larger networks connected to causal
detection (as in the motion bounce illusion, Sekuler et al., 1997).
All of these forms of classification are robust and explanatory,
and often involve the same initial processing units and trans-
ducer populations. We shouldn’t expect a single, unified account
of audition. Like thermoreception and smell, it involves a range
of capacities that admit of distinct forms of classification.
7.3. SYNESTHESIA
Synesthesia is another interesting case for understanding sensory
pluralism. This condition involves (roughly) the reliable activa-
tion of one modality by stimuli presented to another. In this way,
it seems to be a kind of cross-modal interaction, but one impor-
tantly different from typical cases of multisensory integration
or facilitation. In addition, it poses a number of basic defini-
tional and phenomenological questions. Researchers have long
known, for instance, that synesthesia comes in a variety of forms,
and it is difficult to find a single account that covers all (and
only) genuine cases (Macpherson, 2007; Mroczko-Wasowicz and
Werning, 2012)35 . Given the difficulties in presenting a robust,
unified account of synesthesia, we should not be surprised if it
turns out that there are multiple forms of the condition, each dis-
tinctive in various ways. The pluralist perspective suggests that
we should not (simply) hold out for a single mechanism under-
lying the overall condition, but explore the possibility that the
condition arises in a variety of distinctive ways. One could even
allow that so-called normal subjects might exhibit features con-
tinuous with the possession of synesthesia (see Auvray and Deroy,
in press; Cohen, in press). The question of what counts and what
doesn’t count as synesthesia in general might not be a well-formed
question. Maybe synesthesia isn’t a natural kind at all?36
The sensory pluralist can allow that, in some respects, many
cases of synesthesia are extensions of ordinary perceptual capac-
ities, part of the same functional units that underlie our general
experience of the world. On the other hand, from a slightly dif-
ferent explanatory context, we can see discontinuities as well. In
addition, some forms of the condition might be more strongly
connected with one context, and might exploit resources typical
in ordinary perceptual interaction, whereas others might involve
35See also Simner (2012a) target paper, commentaries by Eagleman (2012)
and Cohen Kadosh and Terhune (2012), with a reply by Simner (2012b).
36Gray (2001) makes the case that synesthesia poses problems for Fodorian
modularity, and should be taken seriously in any account of psychologi-
cal kinds. As one might expect, I agree with this assessment, and suggest
in addition that facts about synesthesia also support a version of sensory
pluralism.
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interactions more difficult to reconcile with typical sensory inter-
actions. There is no reason to choose sides here (at least not yet);
once we make clear the explanatory context of our investigations,
and the precise nature of the interactions under investigation, we
can make clear the sense in which these phenomena are like and
unlike other forms of sensory awareness. What this involves, as
in the other cases I’ve discussed, is making clear the explanatory
context and embracing the idea that there may be multiple useful
ways of investigating and theorizing about these interactions37.
7.4. SENSORY SUBSTITUTION
There is one final area of intensive investigation that would
benefit from the pluralist perspective. Sensory substitution and
enhancement devices pose many challenges for traditional monist
accounts of sensory individuation. Such devices provide input
usually provided by one modality through a device that inter-
acts with a different modality. For instance, a camera might be
used to provide inputs to touch for a subject without normal
sight. If a subject is presented with visual information through
a camera system that translated those signals into a vibrat-
ing plate on the tongue, does the resulting experience count as
visual or tactual? There have been many discussions about such
devices38.
The pluralist view suggests that these devices ought to admit
of distinct forms of classification. They pose such a difficulty
because they often have characteristics from bothmodalities. If we
focus on behavioral capacities we might classify the experiences
generated by the device one way; if we focus instead on phe-
nomenal character we might classify it differently. Enhancement
systems might produce novel forms of awareness that don’t fit
into any of our current schemes of classification. They also sug-
gest that the focus of this discussion—the multiple roles that
our low level biological machinery can play—might be too nar-
row. Sensory enhancement and substitution might reveal that
our sensory capacities outstrip the present functions of our
hardware39.
8. SUMMING UP
The main alternative view to pluralism would be some form of
monism: the idea that a single scheme of classification should
define each of the sensory modalities, and their interactions. But
it should be clear from the preceding that it seems highly unlikely
that we will find a unified criteria for defining each of the senses.
Vision differs from the other senses in a multitude of ways, and
plays many distinct roles at different levels of sensory process-
ing. What single account of modality or interaction can capture
that diversity, and then work equally well for audition, propri-
oception, touch, taste, vestibular awareness, sensory dominance,
facilitation, suppression, and cross-modal blends (like flavor)?
37I should emphasize, one final time, that nothing I’ve said here is meant to
rule out genuine disagreements; there can and will be false accounts of the
phenomena that can be definitely ruled out even if sensory pluralism is true.
38For a representative discussion, see (among others): Deroy and Auvray
(2014); Noë (2004); Auvray and Myin (2009); Deroy (2012); Farina (2013);
Rita and Kercel (2003); Froese et al. (2012).
39See Clark (2003) for discussion along these lines.
Others might worry that I’ve left the details here are a little
spare. That is intentional. I do not wish to commit myself to any
particular account of scientific explanation here. If one takes a
mechanistic or functional explanation as ideal for work in cog-
nitive science, then what I say here suggests that we can (and
should) focus on a diversity of functional explanations when it
comes to the senses and their interactions. If one prefers a dif-
ferent explanatory framework (a computational or informational
story, say), then my claims here should motivate us to look for a
diversity of computational processes involved in the generation of
sensory experience.
Nothing that I’ve said requires us to take a stand on interthe-
oretic relations, reductionism, emergence, or explanation. At no
point do I claim that there are sensory systems that can or cannot
be reduced to lower level functional or computational compo-
nents. The claim is that, when it comes to sensory systems, we
should expect distinct explanatory accounts to be available (cf.
Dale et al., 2009). The only substantive commitment I make is
that each system of classification be genuinely explanatory, and
grounded in the objective basic features of the system. In this
sense, it is a genuine ontological pluralism (cf. Ereshefsky, 1992),
but a moderate one. My claim is not that we cannot know what
senses “really are.” It is that, as a matter of fact, senses really are
lots of things, and what counts as explanatory in our theorizing
about sensory interactions depends on how we’re carving the sys-
tems up and what we are trying to explain. So while my point is
distinct from claims about multiple realizability and about levels
of explanation in the cognitive sciences (see Marr, 1982; Dennett,
1989), the view is both compatible with and offered in the spirit
of these views.
As we’ve seen, there has been a lot of work recently on
understanding the nature of multisensory awareness. Arguments
abound concerning whether we need to completely reject our
prior conceptions of sensory modalities and their interactions,
or whether we can salvage some aspects of sensory unity and
cohesion. The sensory pluralist view doesn’t, in itself, settle these
debates. But it does suggest that many of these debates are merely
verbal disputes, where the contexts of investigation and expla-
nation have not been clarified. There need be no debate, for
instance, between those who think of thermoreception as contin-
uous with pain and other interoceptive systems, and those who
investigate the role of thermoreception in object recognition and
sensory exploration. There should be no disputes between views
on which flavor awareness forms a separate modality or not. In
some explanatory contexts it most certainly does; in others it need
not. The pluralist view doesn’t give up on the idea of correct sci-
entific theorizing, it just makes clear something that already is the
case: sensory systems and their interactions are complex, multi-
faceted, and occur at many levels of processing. Our theorizing
about these interactions needs to recognize and take on board
these complexities40.
40I would like to thank the editor and referees for an extremeley helpful set
of comments on earlier versions of this paper. I would also like to thank the
audience and participants at the Network for Sensory Research Workshop
on Multisensory Perception held at the University of Toronto where an early
version of this material was presented.
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